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ABSTRACT
The National Health Service in England and Wales is dependent upon the ﬂow of conﬁ-
dential patient data. In the context of consent to the use of patient health data, insis-
tence on the requirements of an ‘informed’ consent that are difﬁcult to achieve will drive
reliance on alternatives to consent. Here we argue that one can obtain a valid consent to
the disclosure of conﬁdential patient data, such that this disclosure would not amount
to a breach of the common law duty of conﬁdentiality, having provided less information
than would typically be associated with an ‘informed consent’. This position protects
consent as a practicable legal basis for disclosure from debilitating uncertainty or im-
practicability and, perhaps counter-intuitively, promotes patient autonomy.
KEYWORDS: Conﬁdentiality, health data, informed consent, real consent, reasonable
expectations
I . INTRODUCTION
While a considerable literature has been generated around the subject of consent,
there has been relatively little discussion of the informational requirements of a valid
consent from the perspective of the common law duty of conﬁdentiality. This is
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perhaps surprising. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of the National Health
Service, along with other health systems across the world, is dependent upon the ﬂow
of conﬁdential data. Conﬁdential patient data1 must ﬂow not only to support the de-
livery of individual care. Conﬁdential data must also—at times—ﬂow to enable a
health system to operate and to learn: to establish what works, what does not work,
what could be done more effectively, efﬁciently, and safely.
In England and Wales, guidance on legal responsibilities associated with handling
conﬁdential patient data will often provide a summary at some point similar to that
provided in the 2003 NHS Conﬁdentiality: Code of Practice:
information that can identify individual patients, must not be used or disclosed
for purposes other than healthcare without the individual’s explicit consent,
some other legal basis, or where there is a robust public interest or legal justiﬁca-
tion to do so.2
The healthcare that is imagined in this guidance is the patient’s own. Identiﬁable pa-
tient data may ﬂow to support a patient’s own care based on an implied consent. Any
further use of identiﬁable patient data requires an explicit consent or some other legal
justiﬁcation. This responsibility to obtain explicit patient consent, or alternative legal
justiﬁcation, is attributed to the common law duty of conﬁdentiality.3 Of course, the
law of conﬁdence sits within a broader complex of responsibilities4 but it is true to say
that it is principally the common law duty, interpreted in the context of the Human
Rights Act 1998 that is understood to drive the responsibility to obtain patient con-
sent for the disclosure of conﬁdential data.5
1 We refer to patient data, rather than patient information, to avoid discussing the information to be provided
in relation to use or disclosure of information. Otherwise, for the purposes of this article, the terms data and
information should be considered interchangeable.
2 Department of Health Conﬁdentiality: NHS Code of Practice (November 2003) 7. See also GMC
Conﬁdentiality (2009) 6.
3 The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) itself imposes no such requirement. Paragraph 8 of sch 3 of the DPA
provides an alternative legal basis to consent for a data controller when processing for medical purposes.
There is an argument that a proper understanding of schs 2 and 3 of the DPA would prioritise consent as
‘ﬁrst among equals’ and, as per the Human Rights Act 1998, any failure to process on the basis of consent
would require justiﬁcation as necessary and proportionate, in accordance with law, and in pursuit of a legiti-
mate aim. See, for example, D Beyleveld, 0Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public
Good0 (2007) 18 King’s Law Journal 275, 284–85. However, that does not appear to be the current advice
of the Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce (ICO). See, for example, the ICO response to GMC
Consultation on Conﬁdentiality Guidance. In particular, in response to question 8: ‘If it is anticipated that
the disclosure has a legal basis to take place anyway, regardless of consent, then for the purposes of the
DPA another schedule condition should be applied and consent not sought - patients should simply be
clearly informed that the disclosure will take place, to whom and why’. <https://ico.org.uk/media/about-
the-ico/consultation-responses/2015/1043273/ico-response-to-gmc-conﬁdentiality-guidance-consultation.
pdf> accessed December 2016.
4 In England and Wales, the use and disclosure of conﬁdential patient information is subject to several legal
governance mechanisms. These include, but are not limited to: the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human
Rights Act 1998, the National Health Service Act 2006, including Regulations laid under s 251, the Health
and Social Care Act 2012, the common law of conﬁdentiality, and the tort of misuse of private information.
5 See Department of Health (n 2) paras 33 and 41.
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The relative paucity of legal discussion of the informational requirements of a valid
consent might be attributable to many of the leading cases on breach of conﬁdence
focusing on justiﬁcations other than consent.6 Furthermore, there may be an assump-
tion that the law here simply mimics the requirements of a valid consent in other
areas.7 However, because the legal informational requirements of a valid consent are
not uniform across different areas of law, there needs to be some discussion of the
most appropriate approach to informing a consent in the law of conﬁdence. The value
of doing so can be illustrated with reference to current and upcoming issues.
In October 2016, the Association for Clinical Genetic Science (ACGS) and the
Public Health Genomics (PHG) Foundation collaborated in delivery of an evidence
session for the National Data Guardian (NDG). The session sought to engage the as-
sistance of the NDG in addressing a challenge encountered within the ﬁeld of geno-
mic medicine. The challenge relates to inconsistent understanding of the legality of
sharing health (including genetic) data about one person to aid the interpretation of
clinical signiﬁcance of gene test results returned to another. As noted above, tradition-
ally consent has only been implied to disclosure for purposes relating to an individ-
ual’s own care. Disclosure of identiﬁable data to a clinician with no responsibility for
an individual’s care, in order to inform the care provided to another, falls outside that
traditional understanding.
To assess the nature and scale of any challenge to bringing such disclosure within
the scope of a valid consent one must understand the information requirements. Of
course, that is not all that one would need to understand. One would also, for exam-
ple, need to be clear on the requirements regarding the voluntariness of a consent,
what might constitute valid communication, whether there are substantive constraints
upon permissible breadth, etc. However, amongst these issues is the question of what
information an individual would need to be provided with in order for any consent
given to be valid. There is currently no clarity regarding the information provision re-
quirements for a valid consent relevant to an action for breach of a duty of
conﬁdentiality.
Without clarity in relation to the information requirements, it is impossible to be
sure when consent might avoid a breach of a duty of conﬁdence or to be clear about
the extent to which the requirements of a valid consent under the law of conﬁdence
are consistent with the requirements of a valid consent in other areas eg in data pro-
tection law (under the Data Protection Act 1998 or the soon to be in force General
Data Protection Regulation). For those processing conﬁdential patient data, and sub-
ject to the requirements of both the common law and data protection, this creates un-
necessary and unfortunate uncertainty.
In this context, we should also recognise the contemporary signiﬁcance of recom-
mendations made by the NDG in relation to a national consent or opt-out model for
data sharing in relation to identiﬁable health data. In her report, the NDG did not
seek to adjust the underlying requirements of a valid consent but, instead, considered
6 We consider some of these cases below.
7 For discussion of the problems with such an assumption, see G Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in
Health Research Regulation: What are We Missing in the Spaces In-between’ (2017) 25 Medical Law
Review 47.
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when an individual consent is required and when and how individuals should be able
to opt-out of processing that has a legal basis other than consent. Given the current
recommendation that a registered opt-out will not apply to data ﬂowing with a pa-
tient’s explicit consent, an understanding of the requirements of a valid consent is cru-
cial to understanding the operation of the national opt-out model.8
There are a number of things that this article does not do. We do not consider the
question of legal bases for disclosure other than patient consent. We set aside any
question of a statutory or public interest justiﬁcation for use or disclosure of conﬁden-
tial patient data. We do not consider the requirements of a valid consent under the
law of conﬁdence generally: voluntariness, communication, permissible breadth, etc.
Also, for reasons of space, we do not here provide any extended consideration of the
information provision requirements of a valid consent under data protection law. We
focus only on the information requirements of a valid consent from the perspective of
the common law duty of conﬁdentiality. This is just one part, but an important part,
of a picture that must be completed if, alongside separate consideration of these other
things, we are to be clear on the legal requirements applicable to ﬂows of conﬁdential
patient data and consistency of those requirements across the legal landscape.
As the way that healthcare is provided and the methods by which a healthcare sys-
tem may learn become increasingly sophisticated, it is important to establish the pre-
conditions for conﬁdential data to ﬂow. Practice must be able to conﬁdently resist le-
gal challenge. Relating to this, we need to debate the need for alternatives to consent
as legal bases for data to ﬂow in the future. However, without properly understanding
the possibilities for data to ﬂow because of consent, one cannot properly understand
the need for any alternative to consent.
We demonstrate that, at least so far as the common law duty of conﬁdentiality is
concerned (and the associated tort of misuse of private information)—while any valid
consent needs to be appropriately informed—the information required to achieve a
valid consent should not be modelled on the informational levels the law requires to
achieve ‘informed consent’ in the context of medical treatment. Instead, in the context
of conﬁdential data, comparison may be more appropriately made with legal
approaches to consent, which are considered sufﬁcient to establish valid consent even
if that consent is relatively uninformed.
Our intention here is not to dilute the signiﬁcance of respect for individual auton-
omy. Nor is it to undermine important efforts to improve the extent to which individ-
uals are able to engage effectively with the ongoing process of consent or understand
how data is used within the healthcare system.9 On the contrary, we will suggest that
a proper understanding of the information provision requirements of a valid consent
from a legal perspective might lead to people being more involved in decisions about
the use of conﬁdential patient data into the future than might follow a more stringent
understanding of relevant information requirements: this understanding of the re-
quirements may undercut reliance upon alternative legal bases.
8 National Data Guardian for Health and Care, Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-outs (June 2016).
9 J Kaye and others, ‘Dynamic Consent: a Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century Research Networks’
(2015) 23 European Journal of Human Genetics 141.
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We also wish to avoid any suggestion that a valid consent is sufﬁcient to ensure
proper governance of health data. We support those who would argue that a valid
consent is understood to be but one part of an effective regulatory landscape.10 Our
argument here is that, from a legal perspective, consent may defeat a claim of breach
of conﬁdence where use or disclosure is consistent with what a person may reasonably
be understood to have agreed, even if his or her expectations regarding use or disclo-
sure were only informed in a general sense.
The argument proceeds through three parts. In Part One, we focus on the informa-
tional requirements that have developed in the context of consent in the tortious con-
text. A distinction is made in tort between the informational requirements of ‘real’
consent and ‘informed’ consent. In Part Two, we explain why, in the context of a con-
sent to the disclosure of conﬁdential patient data, the information levels underpinning
a consent in the law of conﬁdence are more closely aligned with those required for a
‘real’ consent than an ‘informed’ consent. This leads to Part Three, to a consideration
of the practical implications: What information must be provided in order to gain a
valid consent to the use of data in order to avoid a breach of conﬁdentiality?
Without clarity regarding the necessary information levels, there is a genuine risk
that the law will be understood to present hurdles to proceeding on the basis of a con-
sent. If the minimum information provision requirements can be met, then there is
one less reason to ﬁnd an alternative legal basis. If the requirements of consent are
overstated, then the consequence may be that individuals are denied the choice and
control they might otherwise enjoy.
I I . PART ONE: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ‘REAL’ CONSENT AND
‘INFORMED’ CONSENT
One reason there might have been little discussion of the requirements of a valid con-
sent to the use of conﬁdential data is that there is an assumption that there is nothing
special about the legal requirements of a valid consent relating to the duty to maintain
conﬁdence.11 However, this assumes that the requirements of a legally valid consent
are consistent and clear. There is widespread agreement that to be legally valid, a con-
sent must be freely given by someone with capacity, it must be underpinned by rele-
vant information and communicated.12 Although it is accepted that a consent needs
to be underpinned by relevant information, the level of information adequate to
achieve legally valid consent has varied over time and according to the function of
consent in the circumstances.13 English law has built up a detailed jurisprudence in
the context of consent to medical intervention. However, even in this context, the
10 G Laurie and others, ‘On Moving Targets and Magic Bullets: Can the UK Lead the Way with Responsible
Data Linkage for Health Research?’ (2015) 84 International Journal of Medical Informatics 933.
11 Thank you to Professor Roger Brownsword for making this point.
12 Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 3.
13 Alasdair Maclean distinguishes between legal and ethical consent asserting that ‘there are two “consents”;
one a legal consent required by the law of battery, the other an ethical consent predicated on the patient’s
right to autonomy, which must be obtained if the professional is to avoid liability in negligence’. A Maclean,
Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (Cambridge University Press 2009)
195. We would note that both consents respect a right to autonomy. They are, however, associated with dif-
ferent information requirements.
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question of what information is needed to secure a valid consent to medical interven-
tion depends on whether an individual is being asked to consent to physical interven-
tion, or to running risks associated with that intervention. Furthermore, even where
the law is clear that an ‘informed consent’ is required, the jurisprudence over the last
30 years has been unable to clearly articulate the standard used to judge whether a
consent is properly ‘informed’ or not.14 The purpose of this piece is not to argue that
there is an entirely new set of speciﬁcations for a valid consent to the use of conﬁden-
tial patient data, indeed it is assumed that the standard requirements of capacity, vol-
untariness, adequate information, and effective communication, apply. Instead, this
piece considers what amounts to adequate information such that a person’s consent
to use of her information would mean that such use would not amount to a breach of
the common law duty of conﬁdentiality. We look at the differing and sometimes
unclear informational requirements of a valid consent to medical intervention and ex-
amine where the information provision requirements of a valid consent to the use and
disclosure of conﬁdential patient data might ﬁt within this matrix.
In the context of medical interventions, the patient gives permission for two things:
the running of personal risks that are associated with an intervention and the physical
intervention itself.15 The amount and type of information that patients will need in or-
der to give permission varies between these different aspects of a medical intervention.
In relation to a permission to run particular risks, a patient’s permission expresses her
right to choose in the light of relevant alternatives, which may have different risks.16
There is no equivalent need to inform an individual of alternatives, or associated risks,
in order to respect her right to choose whether to permit physical interference. The
difference is reﬂected in the informational levels the law requires. Consent giving per-
mission to physical interference involved in medical treatment is governed by the tort
of battery, where the legal term of art ‘real’ consent17 is used to depict the conditions
required to achieve legal validity. In contrast, consent which gives permission to run
personal physical risks is governed by the tort of negligence, where the more familiar
term ‘informed’ is used to reﬂect the conditions for achieving legal validity.
14 In Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] UKHL 1
the duty to provide information was based on the professional standard set in Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. However, some judicial unease at this approach was evident in
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] EWCA Civ 865 and even more so in Birch v University
College Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB) which led to dicta doubting this standard for setting
informational requirements. This move away from the professional standard was conﬁrmed in Montgomery
v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. However, until more jurisprudence is established, it might be
argued that how content is imported into this informational standard is not clear.
15 On this, see Maclean (n 13).
16 This would usually be a less risky procedure (see Birch v University College Hospitals NHS Trust [2008]
EWHC 2237 (QB)), but Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 suggests that patients
should also be informed about riskier alternatives.
17 The term ‘real’ consent can be considered a legal term of art which reﬂects what is considered to be a valid
consent in the particular context of consent to medical physical interference, such that the interference does
not amount to a battery. We are grateful to Edward Dove for suggesting that we explain this.
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A. The Tort of Battery and ‘Real’ Consent
If a clinician subjects a patient to physical interference, then without that patient’s
valid consent, and absent alternative legal justiﬁcation, they commit the legal wrong of
battery. To be able to consent to the physical intervention, the patient needs to know
what that physical interference will entail. Most battery cases concerning medical
treatment have involved situations where an intervention was performed against the
patient’s will,18 where a different intervention to the one consented to was per-
formed,19 or where patients have been deliberately and fraudulently misled.20 Thus
the essence of most cases is not whether adequate information has been provided, but
whether any relevant information has been provided. That said, although not typically
an issue, the question of adequacy has been considered by the courts.
In Chatterton v Gerson the Court considered what information was required before
a patient could give a valid consent to a medical physical interference which would
prevent a subsequent action in battery. Bristow J said:
. . . once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure
that is intended, and gives her consent that consent is real21
Thus, the patient only needs to understand the general nature of the operation ‘in
broad terms’ before the law considers this consent to be valid to permit the physical
intervention and, therefore, terms it ‘real’. Information about the general nature of a
single medical procedure might not be particularly extensive or complicated. The min-
imal level of information required to achieve ‘real’ consent does not include a require-
ment to disclose information about the risks associated with the physical interference
or any alternatives.22
For this reason, ‘real’ consent may be relatively easily achieved. It is notable that
we have not seen legal challenge in England arguing that the information given about
the nature of a medical treatment was insufﬁcient to make the patient ‘broadly aware’.
It might be argued that the ease of gaining ‘real’ consent in this context is one of the
things that has enabled consent to become a cornerstone of English medical law.
Consent is readily achievable; so, professionals need not look for alternative legal ba-
ses to protect themselves or their patients.
B. The Tort of Negligence and ‘Informed Consent’
If a clinician subjects a patient to non-negligent risks associated with an intervention
without a valid consent to those risks, if one of these risks eventuates, then the non-
disclosure could be actionable in negligence. It is clear that the information required
for an ‘informed’ consent is different to the information required for ‘real’ consent. In
giving an ‘informed’ consent you still need to be aware of the nature of the procedure
18 Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; Re C (Adult, refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 All
ER 819.
19 Devi v West Midlands RHA [1980] CLY 687.
20 Appleton v Garrett (1997) 8 Med LR 75.
21 [1981] QB 432, 443.
22 For an in-depth discussion of the different requirements of ‘real’ consent and ‘informed’ consent, see
Maclean (n 13).
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to which you are consenting,23 but this information is required as a basis for the infor-
mation about risks which arise in the context of the intervention. The concept of ‘in-
formed’ consent provides a mechanism for patients to consent to the risks of a
procedure as opposed to consenting to the physical intrusion of the procedure in and
of itself. Furthermore, it is when we begin to talk about consenting to risk, that the
concept of alternatives becomes relevant. A person can only make an accurate assess-
ment of the risk she is prepared to run, if she knows about the risks associated with al-
ternatives and with non-intervention. It is this information that sits at the heart of
informing an ‘informed consent’. 24
C. Why Not ‘Inform’ a ‘Real’ Consent?
A failure to disclose risks and beneﬁts, or to compare the proposed physical interven-
tion with alternative courses of action, will not render a ‘real’ consent invalid but it
will mean that the patient cannot have consented to run the risks associated with the
intervention and thus that consent cannot be said to be ‘informed’. In Chatterton v
Gerson, Bristow J felt that the action of battery was inappropriate in cases where the
doctor had acted in good faith, and in the interests of the patient, but in doing so had
been negligent in failing to disclose a risk inherent in the recommended treatment.25
Battery is an intentional tort and has historically been associated with notions of bad
faith.26 Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the courts ﬁnd it inappropriate to hold
that doctors who act in a patient’s best interests, but inadvertently fail to disclose a
risk, have battered the patient.
At this point, it is worth emphasising that in providing individuals with information
about the risks associated with medical intervention we are not seeking to protect
them from harm per se. We are seeking to ensure persons can make an autonomous
choice whether to accept the risks associated with that intervention. This goes beyond
recognising a right to choose on the part of the person giving consent; it recognises
that the individual obtaining the consent has to have a responsibility to inform that
choice. This is a responsibility not recognised in the tort of battery. Hence, a ‘real’
consent need not be ‘informed’.
23 In principle, a claim that the wrong intervention was performed could be brought in negligence. Although
in Chatterton v Gerson (n 21) 443 Bristow J felt that trespass would be the appropriate cause of action in
this case.
24 It is clear in English law that doctors have a duty to inform patient of lower risk alternatives to the treatment
that is posed (Birch v University College Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB)). However, it might
be argued that Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 imposes a duty to inform patients
about other possible procedures irrespective of whether they have a lower risk. InMontgomery, the risk issue
was complicated by the fact that the non-disclosure of information concerned the risk of shoulder dystocia
in child birth. Child birth involves risk to both mother and child. In that case the Supreme Court held that
the doctors had a duty to inform the mother about the alternative of caesarean section which had a higher
risk of morbidity and mortality for the mother than the natural birth.
25 Chatterton v Gerson (n 21) 442, Bristow J relying on the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Reibl v
Hughes (1978) 21 OR (2d) 14.
26 Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237.
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D. Setting Standards in the Information Requirements of ‘Informed’ Consent and
‘Real’ Consent: Whose Perspective Counts?
In the context of consent to medical treatment, English law provides content to the
information requirements by reference to the perspectives of the parties to the con-
sent. Here again we see a distinction in the approach taken for ‘real’ consent in battery
and ‘informed’ consent in negligence.
In relation to ‘real’ consent, there is little judicial discussion about how standards
are set regarding the relevant information content. However, in Chatterton v Gerson
Bristow J. says:
the duty of a doctor is to explain to the patient what he intended to do and the
implications of that action in a way that a careful and responsible doctor would
do in similar circumstances.27
This suggests that the standard for determining what information should be disclosed
to make a patient ‘broadly aware’ of the nature of the medical treatment, thereby ob-
taining ‘real’ consent and avoiding an action in battery, falls to be determined by the
medical profession.
Although medicine, especially in the context of information disclosure, is not an ex-
act science, the medical profession has the opportunity to articulate a relatively uniﬁed
professional view about what is considered to be relevant information about a particu-
lar procedure. Thus, setting informational level standards by reference to the profes-
sion can provide some consistency and certainty for those seeking consent. If the level
of information required to avoid a battery on the basis that there is a ‘real’ consent re-
quires patients to be made ‘broadly aware’ of the nature and purpose of the action by
reference to the reasonable doctor’s view of what is relevant, then gaining consent
need not be particularly onerous or complicated.
The English courts originally took a similar position to setting standards in infor-
mational levels in ‘informed’ consent. In Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem
Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital,28 relying on the Bolam test,29 the House of
Lords held that for the patient to be adequately informed, the risks which need to be
disclosed should be determined by what the medical profession thought it reasonable
to disclose. However, in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board the Supreme Court
was invited to depart from Sidaway and reconsider how standards are set in this con-
text. The Supreme Court considered that the doctor’s duty to disclose information
about risks and alternative treatments should no longer be based on Bolam. Instead
the court held that the doctor is:
under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any
material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable al-
ternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circum-
stances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would
27 Chatterton v Gerson (n 21) 432.
28 [1985] UKHL 1.
29 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
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be likely to attach signiﬁcance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably
be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach signiﬁcance to it.30
Thus, in the context of medical treatment, the level of information that a patient re-
quires before they can give an ‘informed’ consent is referenced to the patient’s per-
spective, and not the professionals’.
E. A Distinction With or Without a Difference?
At ﬁrst sight we might question whether there are signiﬁcant differences between the
views of professionals and patients regarding relevant information in the context of
medical treatment. However, the number of legal challenges concerning
non-disclosure of medical risk information suggests that patients do often want more
information than professionals think they need to disclose.31 The GMC has noted
this discrepancy between the views of professionals and patients in the context of the
use of healthcare data:
Professionals are, of course, people so, at one level, they should appreciate the
needs and concerns of members of the public. However, they also have their
own professional interests and may become inured to concerns that might
impact upon them as citizens, especially as they are often coping with more im-
mediate and pressing issues when dealing with patients, so may not reﬂect the
values and opinions of the average member of the public.32
Support for the argument that practitioners’ views differ from the views of people us-
ing services can also be found generally in relation to the issue of running risks,33
which we know is at the heart of ‘informed’ consent.
In the light of differing professional and public attitudes to information about risks,
Montgomery recognised that an approach to setting informational levels based on
medical professional standards might not provide the information that patients feel
they need. One consequence of this is that there is arguably now signiﬁcantly less clar-
ity concerning what information needs to be disclosed in the context of ‘informed’
consent as compared to ‘real’ consent. Unlike procedural information about the na-
ture of the treatment, information about possible risks and alternatives can be exten-
sive, complicated, and sometimes conﬂicting. Furthermore, patient perspectives about
the relevance of speciﬁc risk information are likely to be diverse. Following
Montgomery, the profession cannot come together collectively to put boundaries
30 [2015] UKSC 11, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed 87.
31 A few high proﬁle ones are: Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley
Hospital [1985] UKHL 1; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; Chester v Afshar
[2004] UKHL 41; Al Hamwi v Johnston and another [2005] EWHC 206 (QB) and Pearce v United Bristol
Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] EWCA Civ 865.
32 General Medical Council, Public and professional attitudes to the privacy of healthcare data; a survey of the liter-
ature, 30 August 2007.
33 S Carr, Enabling Risk, Ensuring Safety: Self-directed Support and Personal Budgets (Report 36, Social Care
Institute for Excellence 2010).
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around the information that is required based on professional perspectives. If this re-
sults in fresh uncertainty and prompts, as a defensive response, increasingly lengthy
and complex consent forms, then—paradoxically—genuinely informed consent may
be made harder to achieve. This is a point that has been explored by others and on
which we need not linger.34 As this discussion demonstrates, the information disclo-
sure burden in the context of consent to medical treatment is heavily focused on ‘in-
formed consent’ to personal risk, rather than ‘real’ consent to physical intervention.35
This is because the information concerning the single medical intervention is often
clear and concise. The clinician may only need to disclose a small amount of informa-
tion to avoid an action in battery. The nature and amount of the potentially relevant
risk information means that it is much more difﬁcult to be clear about what needs to
be disclosed and that often there will be a higher informational burden attached to an
‘informed’ consent.
I I I . PART TWO: CONSENT TO THE USE OF HEALTH DATA
We have outlined the information requirements associated with a valid consent from
the perspective of both the tort of battery and the tort of negligence. We have seen
that they vary in both the extent of the information that must be provided in order for
a consent to be adequately ‘informed’ or ‘real’ and also the perspective from which
one must assess adequacy. Against that backdrop, we will now consider the informa-
tional requirements of a valid consent from the perspective of the common law duty
of conﬁdentiality.
At the outset we might draw parallels between the tort of battery and the common
law duty of conﬁdentiality. Both are grounded in the public interest and the equitable
notion of good faith. Both incorporate an element of wrongdoing. Battery is an inten-
tional tort and breach of conﬁdence suggests some unauthorised or unjust use or dis-
closure of conﬁdential data. The courts have recognised it to be in the public interest
to protect people from a misuse of conﬁdential data—indeed, we now talk about a
tort of misuse of private information as well as a breach of a duty of conﬁdence.36
Private data is now recognised to be worth protecting as an aspect of human auton-
omy and dignity.37 In order to protect people from privacy interferences there is a
need to ensure people have a measure of control over the use of conﬁdential data, in-
cluding its onward disclosure. If an individual gives consent to the use of conﬁdential
data, then it is the intended use and disclosure to which she must agree. An individ-
ual’s privacy, autonomy, and dignity are protected through her authorisation of use.
In these terms, protection from misuse does not require the party receiving conﬁ-
dential data to provide information about any risks associated with disclosure: it re-
quires only that conﬁdential data is used consistent with authorisation and an
34 Manson and O’Neill have previously examined the limits of ‘informed’ consent based on impossible proce-
dures and standards. See N Manson and O O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge
University Press 2007).
35 The cases concerning inadequate information disclosure in the context of medical interventions are negli-
gence cases concerning non-disclosure of risk, rather than battery cases concerning failure to disclose all the
information required to make the patient ‘broadly aware’ of the nature of the medical treatment.
36 OBG Ltd and another v Allan and others [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 [255].
37 Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 (Lord Hoffmann) [50].
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individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy.38 Importantly, a risk of misuse is not a
risk to which one could usually consent in any case. To explain this point, we must
make a distinction between negligent and non-negligent risks. In ‘informed’ consent
the risks which are disclosed are risks of things that might happen without any negligent
or criminal action. Information is not provided about risks of negligent or unlawful ac-
tivity because there is no evidence that people can consent to negligence in the con-
text of medical treatment, or moreover, that professionals can rely on consent to
avoid their duty not to treat a patient negligently.39 However, the risks that concern
people with regard to the use of data for medical purposes40 are typically associated
with negligent,41 unlawful42 or unauthorised use: data being lost, hacked, provided to
third parties, and/or used for purposes other than those described at the time that
consent is given.43 The disclosure of the risks that negligent or unlawful things might
happen would not provide the individual or organisation with a legal ﬂak-jacket:44
they could not rely on consent to argue that they are not responsible for a breach of
conﬁdence which occurred through their negligent, unauthorised, or illegal activity.
As an aside, we note that there is a defence of volenti to the tort of negligence,
based on the premise that a person’s claim for injury can be defeated if they can be
said to have voluntarily assumed the risk of injury where that injury is caused by negli-
gence. However, even though in some cases the courts have treated knowledge as syn-
onymous with consent,45 knowledge of, or willingness to take a risk, are not generally
seen by the courts as the same as consent.46 Moreover, it is well established that the
defence of volenti only goes so far.47 It is difﬁcult to establish,48 applying only in situa-
tions where there is a very high risk and the claimant has done something reckless im-
plying moral culpability.49 There is no evidence in English jurisprudence that the
38 The concept of ‘reasonable expectations’ is more fully discussed later.
39 The defence of volenti has had no application in this context. See discussion below.
40 The purposes for which health data may be used are many and varied. For the purposes of this article we re-
strict ourselves to a consideration of medical purposes as deﬁned by s 251 NHS Act 2006 and/or within
para (h), sch 3, DPA 1998.
41 The 2015 Mid-Year Cyber Risk Report found that for healthcare speciﬁcally, most data breaches are a result
of employee negligence. Surfwatch Labs Situational Awareness Report: 2015 Mid-Year Cyber Risk Report: Risk
Intelligence Trends and Cybercriminal Avenues of Approach; E Snell 25 August 2015 Negligence Top Health
Data Breach Issue, Report Says <http://healthitsecurity.com/news/employee-negligence-top-health-data-
breach-issue-report-says> accessed 26 February 2016; National Data Guardian for Health and Care (n 8)
2.42–2.43.
42 See the recent criminal cyber-attack which affected the NHS: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/
2017/may/12/hospitals-across-england-hit-by-large-scale-cyber-attack> accessed 27 June 2017.
43 Harms are typically associated with abuses of data. For categorisation of such abuses, and description of as-
sociated harms, see G Laurie and others, A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health
and Biomedical Data (Report for Nufﬁeld Council of Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health
Data, 2014).
44 Lord Donaldson referred to consent acting as a legal ﬂak jacket protecting the doctor from litigation in the
context of minors (and parental) consent to medical treatment in Re W (a minor) (medical treatment)
[1992] 4 All ER 627 at 635.
45 Morris v Murray [1990] 3 All ER 801.
46 Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 and Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691.
47 Evidence of this is particularly clear in the context of sport. See, for example, Condon v Basi [1985].
48 See, for example, Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325; Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509; Baker v T E Hopkins &
Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 and Condon v Basi [1985] 2 All ER 45.
49 See, for example,Morris v Murray [1990] 3 All ER 801.
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defence of volenti is applicable to absolve a medical practitioner of negligence where
they inform their patient of a risk that they will be negligent in a medical intervention.
Thus, the notion of negligent, unlawful, or otherwise unauthorised data breach or
risk thereof, is unlikely to form the essence of a consent to the use of health data.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it would not be good professional practice to
draw the person’s attention to the fact that there are general risks of negligent, illegal,
or unintended activity. However, the purpose of disclosure of this information could
not be to allow the person to consent to the running of that risk. Thus, it should not
be understood to be a requirement of a valid consent.
To illustrate the point, consider this example. Imagine an individual gives consent
to the use of her data in a medical research project. Informing her that a renegade re-
search assistant might publish her conﬁdential data on a social media platform without
permission, would not protect the research assistant from an action for breach of con-
ﬁdence. Knowing the possibility of such a risk might inform her decision to partici-
pate—it is possible that it may even be a risk she would want to be aware of—but it is
not a risk to which she can consent. Indeed, to impose such a responsibility to provide
information in respect of negligent, unlawful, or otherwise unauthorised use would ex-
ceed the responsibilities associated with even an ‘informed consent’ to medical
treatment.
Returning to the distinction drawn between negligent and non-negligent risks, we
turn now to consider the relevance of ‘non-negligent’ risks to our argument. Even
though most of the risks likely to be of concern relate to abuses: negligent, unauthor-
ised, or illegal activity, it is possible to envisage a situation where a risk, perhaps of
identiﬁcation, might arise without wrongdoing on behalf of those who are under a
duty of conﬁdence to the data subject. Imagine the situation where a researcher ob-
tains identiﬁable health data from a person and uses this in a research project. The re-
searcher gained consent to the use of this identiﬁable data and consent to the
publication of this data in anonymised form. However, through no fault of the re-
search team, the person is subsequently identiﬁed when the published anonymous re-
search data is combined with other data which becomes legitimately publically
available. In this context, there does not appear to be a breach of conﬁdence. As ar-
gued earlier, as with the tort of battery, breach of conﬁdence requires wrongdoing.
Those under a duty to maintain conﬁdence have not misused the information and
have not acted unjustly. Let us imagine they have done everything that could reason-
ably have been expected of them to protect conﬁdentiality.
Nevertheless, one might argue that there is a wrong done: it was wrong not to tell
the research participant of the possibility of (re)identiﬁcation from the published data.
However, if the non-disclosure of a non-negligent risk was a legal wrong, then it
would be due to negligent non-disclosure of risk, not due to the publication of the ano-
nymised data. Liability would be assessed under the law of negligence, not the duty of
conﬁdence. This is an important distinction. Not least of all because a failure to pro-
vide the information about risk would not invalidate the consent to the use and disclo-
sure of conﬁdential data within the scope of the authorisation. Here we begin to see a
distinction between the law of conﬁdence and the law of negligence parallel to the
one we see between the law of battery and the law of negligence in the context of con-
sent to medical treatment.
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We should emphasise that there is currently no case law suggesting that a person
gaining consent to use of patient data would be liable in negligence for non-disclosure
of non-negligent risks, such as the risk that the data subject might subsequently be
identiﬁed through no fault of the person gaining consent. We are considering only the
legal circumstances under which information about non-negligent risks might have to
be provided; that is, where a failure to provide the information was itself negligent.
However, were the courts to decide that non-disclosure of the risk of non-negligent
re-identiﬁcation when gaining consent to the use of patient data is culpable in negli-
gence, then we would point out that it does not follow that the high level of informa-
tion and the requirement to assess materiality in the context of the particular case
would follow necessarily as it applies in the context of consent to medical treatment.
Further consideration of this point requires a paper on negligence rather than one on
breach of conﬁdence. However, given the arguments around a persistent non-
negligent risk of re-identiﬁcation of published anonymised data,50 it may be sensible
to always succinctly disclose this risk. This would be irrespective of the statistical level
of the risk and without assessing materiality in individual cases. As we note above, dis-
closure of such risks may be good practice. They are not, however, required in order
to avoid a breach of conﬁdence.
If ‘informed’ consent focuses on consent to running risks, then there is no clear
reason why the doctrine of ‘informed’ consent, and the need to set standards by refer-
ence to the patient’s perspective, should set the informational focus in consent to the
use of one’s health data. Indeed, it seems that the kind of information that would be
useful to patients who are being asked to give permission to the use of their health
data is much more akin to the information required for a ‘real’ consent. That is, the in-
formation that concerns the nature and purpose of the use and disclosure intended. It
is this that people are being asked to legitimise as opposed to potential negligent or
unlawful activity.
However, even if what is required in the context of a consent to use of health data
is a ‘real’ consent, we still may not get the same level of clarity and brevity regarding
adequate information in the context of a consent to use of health data as is regularly
achieved in the context of a single medical intervention. First, information about uses
of health data is often varied and uncertain. Explaining a number of deﬁnite, probable,
and possible uses by varying deﬁnite, probable, and possible entities, in a way which
could be said to achieve a ‘broad awareness’ of what will happen, will include signiﬁ-
cantly greater information than that required to achieve ‘broad awareness’ in the con-
text of a single medical intervention. Secondly, it does not follow that just because the
professional perspective is privileged in the context of a real consent to physical inter-
ference, it will be similarly privileged in the context of a ‘real’ consent to conﬁdential
data use. However, removing the terminology of ‘informed’ consent and replacing it
with the application of a clear legal principle of ‘real’ consent, coupled with an estab-
lished standard for setting relevant information levels needed to achieve the ‘broad
50 <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/anonymous-nhs-database-
could-still-allow-patients-to-be-identiﬁed-expert-warns-10001783.html> accessed 11 May 2017. P Ohm
‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymisation’ (2010) 57 (6) UCLA
Law Review1701.
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awareness’ required by ‘real’ consent, will provide greater clarity concerning the kind
of information that is required to support a valid consent to the use of health data
than we have now.
IV . PART THREE: SETTING STANDARDS IN BREACH OF
CONFIDENCE AND MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
Although there is little consideration of the informational levels which should under-
pin a valid consent in the context of the use of conﬁdential data, the English courts
have established a rich jurisprudence regarding how legal standards are set in the con-
text of use of information which is conﬁdential or private without consent. This may in-
ﬂuence how content is determined in informational standards of consent to the use of
conﬁdential data.
In AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) Lord Goff deﬁned the duty of conﬁdence in
broad terms:
a duty of conﬁdence arises when conﬁdential information comes to the knowl-
edge of a person (the conﬁdant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is
held to have agreed, that the information is conﬁdential, with the effect that it
would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclos-
ing the information to others.51
Protection equivalent to that originally offered by Lord Goff’s broad principle is now
found in the concept of ‘reasonable expectation’. Thus, a duty will exist whenever a
person knows or ought to know that another can reasonably expect his or her privacy
to be protected52 or, as Baroness Hale put it in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers:
[W]hen the person publishing the information knows or ought to know that
there is a reasonable expectation that the information in question will be kept
conﬁdential.53
According to Lord Hope, ‘reasonable expectation’ is determined by reference to ‘a
person of ordinary sensibilities’ in the position of the person to whom the information
relates.54 Thus the circumstances will determine if a disclosure is consistent with an
individual’s ‘reasonable expectations’: only if a person of ordinary sensibilities could
be said to have a ‘reasonable expectation’ that his or her data will not be disclosed, or
not disclosed without authorisation, will such disclosure constitute an infringement of
51 [1990] 1 AC 109, 281.
52 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] UKHL 22 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead 21, Lord Hope of
Craighead 84 and Baroness Hale 137. In Campbell, the common law duty of conﬁdence was interpreted so
as to give effect to Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, holding that the common law can
address the misuse of private information. In the context of the facts in Campbell, Lord Nicholls felt that the
more natural description was that the information was private and the essence of the tort was better encap-
sulated as misuse of private information. Sometimes information may be described as private and conﬁden-
tial and could qualify for protection by either tort. In other situations, information may be private but not
conﬁdential.
53 [2004] UKHL 22 Baroness Hale 134.
54 ibid (Lord Hope), 99. See alsoMurray v Express Newspapers [2008] EWCA Civ 446, 35– 36.
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privacy and give rise to a cause of action for either breach of conﬁdence or misuse of
private information.
In Campbell Lord Hope said:
Where the person is suffering from a condition that is in need of treatment one
has to try, in order to assess whether the disclosure would be objectionable, to
put oneself into the shoes of a reasonable person who is in need of that
treatment.55
There is ambiguity here regarding whether standards of what would be objectionable
in terms of disclosure of conﬁdential data are referenced to the conﬁder or the conﬁ-
dant. However, reading Baroness Hale and Lord Hope’s quotes from Campbell to-
gether they seem to suggest that the standard is set by the professional who has a
duty to consider the reasonable person’s view. Once this consideration can be demon-
strated, the professional has reached the required standard. However, in the particular
context of the conﬁdence of health data the courts had previously stated that it is the
professional perspective and not the patient perspective which provides the content
for the standard of care.
In R v Department of Health Ex P Source Informatics56 Source Informatics was a
database company that collected data on GP prescribing from prescriptions submitted
to pharmacies and sold the information, without patient identiﬁers, to pharmaceutical
companies for marketing purposes. The Department of Health issued a policy state-
ment declaring that this was a breach of conﬁdence because there was no consent to
this use. Source Informatics sought judicial review of this policy statement. In the
Court of Appeal, Simon-Brown LJ felt that the question for the court was whether the
conﬁder’s privacy had been invaded by a breach of conﬁdence by the pharmacists.57
In his view:
The conﬁdant was placed under a duty of good faith to the conﬁder and the
touchstone by which to judge the scope of this duty and whether or not it has
been fulﬁlled or breached is his own conscience, no more and no less.58
Thus, the question in Source Informatics was: would a reasonable pharmacist’s consci-
ence be troubled by the proposed use to be made of patients’ prescriptions?59 It was
common for pharmacies to be paid for access to their anonymised prescription data,60
demonstrating that pharmacists were generally not troubled by this use. In the event,
the court found the patient’s privacy interests were not engaged. According to Simon-
Brown LJ the patient’s only legitimate interest was in the protection of his privacy and
this was safeguarded by anonymization.61
55 ibid (Lord Hope), 98.
56 [2000] 1 All ER 786.
57 ibid (Simon-Brown LJ), 797.
58 ibid (Simon-Brown LJ), 796.
59 ibid.
60 ibid (Simon-Brown LJ), 788.
61 ibid (Simon-Brown LJ), 797.
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It seems most likely that the approach taken in Source Informatics is now best un-
derstood to have been overtaken by the approach taken in the more recent Campbell
case. The courts will require a professional acting in good conscience to try to ‘put
oneself into the shoes of a reasonable person’ in the position of the conﬁder. That is,
for the professional viewpoint to be expected to take account of public and patient at-
titudes. There is consistent and clear empirical evidence to suggest that the use of pa-
tient data for particular purposes, eg commercial purposes, is troubling to patients and
the public (discussed further below). Thus, patients would likely have been troubled
by the commercial marketing use of data in Source Informatics, they just did not know
about it.62 Source is not the only example of professionals sanctioning the use of pa-
tient health data for commercial uses that patients are likely to ﬁnd objectionable. The
review of data releases by the NHS Information Centre (IC)63 found that the IC had
made four Data Sharing Agreements with three re-insurance companies despite the
fact that it was clear that people object to their data being used by insurers.64 This
does not mean that patient and professional views about legitimate uses of patient
health data always conﬂict. However, where there are conﬂicts, they could have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the public perception of the ability of professionals or professional
organisations to act as a guardian of conﬁdential patient data. Any erosion of public
trust may impede the ability to use patient data to its full potential.65 Thus a move to
recognise that a professional’s viewpoint must be informed appropriately by the ‘rea-
sonable expectations’ of those whose information they handle is to be welcomed.
In the context of the uses of health data which might be complex and varied,66 the
professional obtaining consent is arguably in a better position than the patient to de-
termine what information will make the patient ‘broadly aware’ of what will happen to
their data. However, in the context of the common law duty of conﬁdentiality, a move
by the courts away from the professional conscience perspective reﬂected in Source to
one that recognises the relevant standard to be what a professional ought to under-
stand to be the ‘reasonable expectation’ of a patient in the circumstances may do
more to engender public trust. There is the potential to allow professionals to collec-
tively determine what is reasonable, but also to insist that in doing so, the signiﬁcant
evidence of public and patient attitudes67 is taken into account. This leads us to the
62 Further because their privacy interests were not engaged, in that they could not be identiﬁed because the in-
formation was effectively anonymised, they did not qualify for protection of their interest in their data only
being used in projects which they did not object to. Precluding disclosure of information to others to pro-
tect the conﬁder’s private information per se is the classic interpretation of the interest in conﬁdence or pri-
vacy. However, as the disclosure and use of heath data for multiple and diverse propose grows, the duty of
conﬁdentially has evolved to protect the conﬁder against uses of their data that they do not ﬁnd agreeable,
rather than an objection to people knowing information about them per se.
63 Review of Data Releases by the NHS Information Centre Sir Nick Partridge 17 June 2014, para 27.
64 Indeed, this objection was acknowledged in the report, ibid.
65 We know from Care.data that lack of public trust can have a signiﬁcant impact on the ability to use health
data. See the All Party Parliamentary Group for Patient Involvement in Health and Social Care. Care.data
Inquiry, November 2014.
66 Which precludes the achievement of ‘informed’ consent in Manson and O’Neill (n 34).
67 Wellcome Trust, Summary Report of Qualitative Research into Public Attitudes to Personal Data and Linking
Personal Data (2013); Royal Statistical Society Response to the Department of Health on Protecting Health and
Care Information in England: A Consultation on Proposals to Introduce New Regulations (August 2014);
Wellcome Trust, The One-Way Mirror: Public Attitudes to Commercial Access to Health Data (March 2016).
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question what information needs to be provided in practice to generate a ‘reasonable
expectation’ of a use such that a person can be said to be ‘broadly aware’ of it?
A. Generating ‘Reasonable Expectations’ in ‘Real’ Consent: What Information
is Needed?
In the context of use or disclosure of a person’s health data, ‘reasonable expectations’
of privacy will encompass expectations about when conﬁdential data may or may not
be shared. At the outset we noted that health professionals do not generally ask pa-
tients whether they can share their health data with other members of the health care
team. The basis of that sharing is, nevertheless, understood to be the patient’s consent.
There is a professional assumption that patients reasonably expect sharing necessary
to provide safe and effective care when the patient consents to receive that care.68
Guidance recommends that information is ‘readily available’69 about such sharing70
but there is no suggestion that, if a speciﬁc disclosure has not been brought to the at-
tention of the patient, then a lack of information provision will render consent invalid.
How far does the information which should be ‘readily available’,71 but not necessarily
speciﬁcally brought to a patient’s attention, extend? What lengths must a professional
go to provide speciﬁc information prior to a consent to use of conﬁdential data?
There are likely to be very different levels of understanding of the regular uses of
conﬁdential patient data, particularly as they extend beyond an individual’s care. Uses
of conﬁdential patient data for purposes beyond individual care, could be multiple
and varied: including but not limited to the management of health and social care ser-
vices (including commissioning of services), service evaluation and auditing quality of
care, public health purposes (including health protection and health improvement),
education and training, as well as health research and use by commercial entities.
Each of these uses may involve disclosure to different organisations and persons.
There are so many varied and diverse uses to which that information might be put
that if being ‘broadly aware’ does require the patient be aware of more than the simple
fact that their health data will be further used or disclosed, then even a ‘real’ consent
may require information be provided speciﬁcally about a signiﬁcant range of uses.
Although there is general support for the use of health data to provide public
health beneﬁts,72 there are nuances within that support, and different uses of patient
health data by different organisations enjoy different levels of acceptance.73 For exam-
ple, work done by Wellcome has found that it is more acceptable to disclose health
data to universities and charities than to commercial organisations. Further acceptabil-
ity declined sharply where the intended disclosee was a private provider either inside
or outside the heath sector.74 People did show some support for specialist analytics
and research companies working closely with the NHS participants, pharmaceutical
companies, and retail and pharmacy sectors having their data, but this was only if the
68 Conﬁdentiality: Good Practice in Handling Patient Information (January 2017).
69 ibid, para 28 b.
70 ibid paras 10 and 28 b.
71 ibid.
72 See n 67.
73 Wellcome Trust, The One-Way Mirror (n 67) .
74 ibid 9.
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purpose demonstrated some public beneﬁt. On the other hand, most people found it
unacceptable for insurance companies and marketing companies to have their data be-
cause they could not perceive a public beneﬁt. They also erred on the side of caution
and opposed sharing with a commercial organisation where the purpose was uncer-
tain.75 This work shows where information disclosure requirements should focus in
order to adequately inform a ‘real’ consent: it is in relation to these uses that people
do not generally either expect or accept as appropriate that there is a need to give
more granular information. This is not to suggest that no information would need to
be given to underpin a consent to a use that is generally acceptable in order for people
to expect it. Indeed, there may be a difference between what people ﬁnd acceptable
and what people reasonably expect.76 The argument is that evidence that a use is un-
acceptable to many is evidence that more effort should be made to ensure that people
are aware if it is an intended use: without that effort it will be more challenging to de-
scribe it a ‘reasonable expectation’ that such use will follow consent. So, for example,
speciﬁc information should be given about any uses that might not beneﬁt the patient
community.77 In this way, evidence of public opinion on acceptability of use is a ﬁrst
step to determining how granular the need for information to establish a reasonable
expectation that the use will follow consent should be.
The need for speciﬁc information to be given prior to a valid consent could be mi-
nimised by promoting a general awareness of the uses of patient data. If a particular
use is recognised to be common knowledge and thus obvious to a person as a conse-
quence of consent, then only minimal information could be provided about that use
during the consent process itself without undermining the validity of that consent.
However, it is unlikely that raising public awareness would generate a ‘reasonable ex-
pectation’ of use in the context of a use which evidence shows the public generally
ﬁnd unacceptable, such that minimal information about that use could then be given
in the process of gaining consent. In the case of uses which the evidence suggests the
public ﬁnds contentious, much greater weight would be put on giving the individual
detailed information about the particular use in the act of gaining their consent before
they could be said to ‘reasonably expect’ the use to be authorised by their consent.
The position that we are advocating is one that allows consent to be the basis of
disclosure and use of health data; the responsibilities regarding information provision
are not disproportionate, but they should ensure that the consent is ‘real’ and that
people are informed about those things that are most likely to be considered material.
Professionals do not, however, have to subjectively assess materiality in every case:
there is scope for professional guidance on what information needs to be provided to
patients. Such guidance should take account of the evidence available on patient and
public attitudes. The growing evidence concerning people’s views on the acceptability
of the use of their health data could be an important indicator of where speciﬁc infor-
mation ought to be provided. Where the conditions of who can use the data and why
75 ibid 11.
76 Mark J Taylor and Natasha Taylor ‘Health Research Access to Personal Conﬁdential Data in England and
Wales: Assessing Any Gap in Public Attitude between Preferable and Acceptable Models of Consent’
(2014) 10 (15) Life Sciences, Society and Policy 1.
77 This was not the approach to information provision that the Health and Social Care Information Centre
adopted when seeking to establish an opt-out consent system to Care.data.
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are deliberately constructed to conform with those more likely to be readily ac-
cepted—being less likely to be surprising or contentious—then consent may be ‘real’
even on the basis of little ﬁne-grained information. However, where data is to be used
by organisations, or for purposes, that are less widely expected or supported (eg
shared outside the NHS or the medical research context), then it will be important to
provide signiﬁcantly more information about these uses, and in more detail, before
persons feel that they are ‘broadly aware’ of the nature of the potential uses such that
they can be considered to have accepted them. The evidence gathered on attitudes to
use of health data demonstrates where the focus should be if providing information
about uses of health data is to be standardised by reference to public attitudes regard-
ing the general acceptability of potential uses.
If our argument to accept as legally valid a relatively uninformed consent seems
radical, then we would note that the courts have found that minimal information
about a possible intended use can be sufﬁcient to give the patient a ‘reasonable expec-
tation’ that their information will be used in a particular way. In R (on the application
of W, X, Y and Z) v Secretary of State for Health78 limited patient data was passed by
NHS Trusts to the Secretary of State for Health and then to the Home Ofﬁce for the
purposes of imposing immigration sanctions applicable in case of certain debts being
owed to the NHS. The speciﬁed limited information contained name and date of
birth of the patient and, where available, his or her address, nationality and travel doc-
ument number with expiry date and details about the amount and date of the debt,
and the NHS trust to which it was owed.
At ﬁrst instance, the judge decided that due to the lack of clinical information it
contained, the information did not reach the threshold of private or conﬁdential.79
The Court of Appeal rejected this and supported the position taken by professional
guidance that all identiﬁable patient data held by a doctor or a hospital must be
treated as conﬁdential. The Court’s position was informed by the fact that this ap-
proach is taken in publicly available professional guidance, which itself can be under-
stood to reﬂect and inform the expectations of patients. However, despite establishing
the general position, the Court of Appeal found that in the particular circumstances of
this case, the information disclosed was not conﬁdential or private vis-a-vis the
Secretary of State or the Home Ofﬁce:
We do not see how overseas visitors who, before they are treated in an NHS
hospital, are made aware of the fact that, if they incur charges in excess of £1,000
and do not pay them within 3months, the Information may be passed to the
Secretary of State for onward transmission to the Home Ofﬁce for the stated im-
migration purpose can have any, still less any reasonable, expectation that the in-
formation will not be transmitted in precisely that way. They will, however, have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information vis-a- vis any-
one else.80
78 [2015] EWCA Civ 1034.
79 [2014] EWHC 1532 (Admin) 45.
80 [2015] EWCA Civ 1034, 44 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, as patients were made aware of the fact that treatment incurred charges, they
were deemed to ‘reasonably expect’ and to have accepted81 that their data would be
shared with regard to those charges if the debt was not paid.
In W, X, Y, and Z, the purpose was not directly related to healthcare, nor was the
organisation a health care provider. However, the Court was satisﬁed here because in-
formation had been provided, and had in the Court’s view been accepted, in relation
to the speciﬁc disclosure. Thus, the provision of some limited information created a
‘reasonable expectation’ regarding further use by a non-healthcare institution for non-
healthcare purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
We have argued that basing the information needed to achieve a valid consent to the
use of health data on the approach to obtaining ‘real’ consent in battery, could pro-
duce a workable consent model in the health data context. The minimal level of infor-
mation required for a consent which avoids a battery in medical intervention could be
sufﬁcient to avoid breaching conﬁdence in the context of use of patient health data.
Nevertheless, even satisfying this requirement could require considerable amounts of
information to be made available to patients if they are to be ‘broadly aware’ of all
uses of their information which go beyond direct care. Hence, we have argued that a
workable ‘real’ consent model can be constructed by ensuring that the level and gran-
ularity of the information which achieves ‘broad awareness’ reﬂects the growing evi-
dence of people’s concerns and, for that matter, their lack of concerns regarding the
use of their health information. The law might achieve this granularity by referencing
the information needed to achieve ‘broad awareness’ to the notion of ‘reasonable ex-
pectations’. On this perspective, the information underpinning consent can focus
on those uses which are likely to be unexpected or contentious. Targeting the granular
information required to underpin consent to uses which would not be ‘reasonably ex-
pected’, alongside constructing the kinds of things that people’s health data might
be used for so that reasonable people are unlikely to ﬁnd them contentious, will
make consent achievable. This approach would do signiﬁcantly more to protect pa-
tient autonomy than an approach to using conﬁdential data that is not based on
consent.
Insistence on requirements of an ‘informed’ consent that are ill-ﬁtting to the major-
ity of risks associated with the use of health data and are impractical in requiring indi-
vidual assessments of materiality will drive reliance on alternatives to consent. We
have argued that the informational standards in a consent to use of health data need
not be understood to be so onerous as to be impracticable. If we are to maintain con-
sent in the context of the use of health data, then the information requirements need
81 The importance of acceptance is illustrated by the counter-examples given: ‘There may, however, be special
circumstances where the position will be different. For example, the patient may have been admitted uncon-
scious to the A&E Department of a hospital (for which no charges are made) and may have been trans-
ferred, still unconscious, to a hospital ward (where treatment does attract charges). There may also be
emergency cases where the clinical staff cannot refuse treatment and where, in practice, the patient has no
choice but to accept the terms on which it is offered. Furthermore, in some cases the patient may be vulner-
able and/or unable to speak English’. [2015] EWCA Civ 1034, 45.
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to be simple and workable to prevent the erosion of choice which follows unworkable
informational requirements.
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